Table of Contents
Introduction: Can an unconstitutional exception protect itself?
In 1990, the Florida Legislature enacted Chapter 90-14, expanding Florida’s wrongful-death remedies to recognize certain losses suffered by adult children and parents of adult children.
The Legislature simultaneously created an exception: section 768.21(8), Florida Statutes, which denied those expanded noneconomic damages to specified survivors when death resulted from medical negligence.
The exclusion was reportedly a political compromise necessary to secure passage of the broader legislation.
That history raises two related constitutional questions.
First, if subsection (8) violates the Florida Constitution, can the remaining survivor remedies continue operating without it?
Second, could the political compromise that produced the exclusion also provide a legal argument for preventing its removal?
Florida’s longstanding severability doctrine provides a framework for examining both questions. The Chapter 90-14 severability analysis requires consideration of the statute’s original legislative purpose, the constitutional limitations on legislative compromises, and whether the remaining survivor remedies can operate independently.
I. Severability was established Florida law before 1990
The Florida Supreme Court’s decision in Cramp v. Board of Public Instruction of Orange County, 137 So. 2d 828 (Fla. 1962), is particularly instructive.
The case arose from a constitutional challenge to Florida’s statutory loyalty oath.
After the United States Supreme Court invalidated a portion of the oath, the Florida Supreme Court considered whether the remainder could continue operating.
The Florida court identified four considerations:
- Whether the unconstitutional provision can be separated from the valid provisions.
- Whether the remaining provisions can independently accomplish their legislative purposes.
- Whether the valid and invalid provisions are so interconnected that the Legislature would not have enacted the remainder independently.
- Whether a complete, operative statute remains after the unconstitutional language is removed.
Importantly, the Florida Supreme Court did not describe this doctrine as newly created.
It cited earlier Florida decisions, including Harris v. Bryan, 89 So. 2d 601 (Fla. 1956), and Kass v. Lewin, 104 So. 2d 572 (Fla. 1958).
Severability was therefore established Florida law decades before Chapter 90-14.
What the Court actually did in Cramp
The Court removed the constitutionally objectionable language while preserving the remainder of the loyalty-oath statute.
It concluded that the remaining provisions could fulfill the Legislature’s purpose independently.
The decision illustrates a fundamental principle:
A court need not destroy an entire legislative enactment merely because one provision violates the Constitution.
The controlling question is whether the valid remainder satisfies the requirements for independent operation and legislative intent.
II. The 1990 political compromise
Chapter 90-14 expanded eligibility for wrongful-death damages while excluding medical-negligence claims from specified portions of that expansion.
Historical accounts indicate that the exclusion helped overcome opposition from medical interests.
In an amicus brief submitted during Mizrahi v. North Miami Medical Center, the Association for Responsible Medicine (ARM) quoted statements attributed to Senator John Grant describing the exemption as a compromise necessary to obtain passage.
The brief also quoted legislative testimony attributing the exclusion to political considerations.
More controversially, footnote 8 of ARM’s original brief alleged, on information and belief, that the Florida Medical Association (FMA) and Academy of Florida Trial Lawyers reached an informal understanding concerning the expansion of survivor remedies.
According to ARM, the alleged understanding had two components:
- Medical interests would not oppose the expanded survivor remedies if medical negligence remained excluded.
- The Academy would refrain from litigating the constitutionality of the exclusion.
The second allegation is disputed.
As part of this research, Florida Hellthcare consulted an individual with knowledge of the historical legislative discussions surrounding Chapter 90-14. The individual’s identity is withheld to respect the private nature of the conversation.
The discussion provided additional historical context but did not produce documentary confirmation of the alleged agreement concerning future constitutional litigation. Accordingly, the existence and terms of any such agreement remain unverified.
However, the available Florida Supreme Court dockets for Mizrahi, Garber v. Snetman, and Stewart v. Price do not identify an Academy amicus filing.
The original ARM footnote was also absent from a subsequently revised brief submitted pursuant to court orders concerning ARM’s appellate materials.
The precise grounds for its removal remain under investigation.
These circumstances establish the existence of a historical allegation and a subsequent dispute. They do not establish that the alleged nonlitigation agreement occurred.
Why the distinction matters
A political agreement to support legislation is different from an agreement not to challenge that legislation’s constitutionality.
Even without a nonlitigation agreement, however, the exclusion itself could influence the economics of future litigation.
That practical consequence requires no proof of an undisclosed arrangement.
The 1997 Attempt to Complete the 1990 Reform
The medical-negligence exclusion did not go unchallenged by subsequent legislators.
In February 1997, Senator Ginny Brown-Waite sponsored SB 40, legislation intended to expand damages available to survivors of patients killed through medical negligence.
The proposal encountered opposition from medical associations, hospitals, insurers, and business interests.
A February 19, 1997, Orlando Sentinel article reported that Senator John Grant, who had participated in the 1990 legislative effort, characterized the original exclusion as a compromise necessary to secure passage of the broader wrongful-death reforms.
Grant described the 1990 enactment as obtaining only part of the desired reform and expressed support for completing the effort.
His 1997 statement provides retrospective evidence from a participant in the 1990 legislative process that the medical-negligence exclusion was understood as a concession rather than the ultimate objective of expanding survivor remedies.
The 1997 effort is therefore relevant to the historical severability inquiry.
It demonstrates that, within seven years of Chapter 90-14’s enactment, legislators were attempting to extend the expanded survivor remedies to medical-negligence cases without withdrawing those remedies from other survivors.
Source: Orlando Sentinel, “Tough Job: Punishing Doctors Who Kill,” February 19, 1997.
III. Did the compromise create a severability defense?
The third Cramp factor requires consideration of whether the Legislature would have enacted the surviving provisions without the invalid provision.
This creates an important question concerning Chapter 90-14.
If medical interests conditioned their support for expanded survivor remedies on the exclusion of medical negligence, could that compromise later be invoked to argue that the remedies and exclusion were legally inseparable?
Such an argument could have substantial consequences.
If subsection (8) were declared unconstitutional, a party defending the original legislative arrangement might contend that the expanded survivor remedies must also be invalidated.
But political bargaining is not identical to legislative intent for severability purposes.
The preferences of private organizations do not control the meaning or constitutional validity of an enacted statute.
A court must examine the legislation itself, its purposes, its structure, and the relevant legislative record.
An organization might have regarded an exception as indispensable to securing its support without the Legislature necessarily intending that the entire statutory expansion fail if the exception were later invalidated.
The fact that a concession helped legislation pass does not automatically establish that the valid statutory provisions cannot survive without it.
IV. The original Mizrahi and Garber litigation already presented a severability solution
Severability was expressly raised during the constitutional challenges to subsection (8).
In the petitioner’s brief in Garber v. Snetman, Florida Supreme Court Case No. 93,650, counsel argued that the medical-negligence exclusion could be held unconstitutional without adversely affecting the remainder of Chapter 90-14.
The brief cited Smith v. Department of Insurance, 507 So. 2d 1080, 1089 (Fla. 1987), in support of that position.
The Academy’s Earlier Participation in Constitutional Litigation
The significance of Smith extends beyond its application of severability principles.
In that 1987 proceeding, the Academy of Florida Trial Lawyers participated in challenging Florida’s Tort Reform and Insurance Act of 1986, Chapter 86-160, Laws of Florida. The Florida Medical Association participated on the opposing side.
The Florida Supreme Court invalidated the challenged $450,000 limitation on noneconomic damages while preserving other portions of the enactment under Florida’s severability doctrine.
Thus, the 1987 litigation not only placed the Academy and FMA on opposing sides of constitutional damages litigation but also provided a concrete example of Florida’s severability doctrine operating before the enactment of Chapter 90-14.
This history is particularly relevant when compared with the subsequent Mizrahi, Garber, and Stewart proceedings.
Unlike the Academy’s documented participation in Smith, no Academy amicus filing has been identified in the available Supreme Court dockets for Mizrahi, Garber, or Stewart. This contrast warrants historical examination but does not establish an agreement concerning future constitutional litigation.
The Severability Remedy Presented to the Court
The Garber petitioners were not asking the Florida Supreme Court to eliminate wrongful-death remedies for other survivors.
They sought to remove the medical-negligence exception while preserving the expanded remedies.
That proposed outcome was consistent with the preservation principle illustrated by Cramp and applied in Smith.
The Florida Supreme Court ultimately upheld subsection (8) against the equal-protection challenge in Mizrahi v. North Miami Medical Center, 761 So. 2d 1040 (Fla. 2000).
Because the Court upheld the challenged provision, it did not need to resolve the consequences of declaring subsection (8) unconstitutional and severing it from the remaining legislation.
Consequently, the severability question should not be described as having been conclusively resolved by Mizrahi.
V. The 2025 Legislature approved the statutory arrangement proposed by the challengers
In 2025, the Florida Legislature passed HB 6017.
The legislation would have eliminated subsection (8)’s medical-negligence exclusion while preserving the underlying statutory survivor remedies.
The House approved the bill 104–6 on March 26, 2025.
The Senate approved it 33–4 on May 1, 2025.
Governor Ron DeSantis vetoed the legislation on May 29, 2025.
The veto prevented the bill from becoming law.
Nevertheless, the Legislature’s recorded action is significant.
Both chambers approved a statutory arrangement in which the general survivor remedies would continue operating without the medical-negligence exclusion.
The 2025 Legislature thereby demonstrated its willingness to preserve the remedies independently of subsection (8).
This does not conclusively establish what the 1990 Legislature would have enacted in the absence of the medical-negligence exception.
Nor does a vetoed bill enjoy the legal presumption of constitutionality applicable to a duly enacted statute.
But the 2025 legislative action provides concrete evidence of a later legislative judgment favoring the continued operation of those remedies without the exclusion.
VI. Chapter 90-14 Severability: Applying the Four Cramp Factors
1. Can subsection (8) be separated?
Subsection (8) identifies damages that cannot be recovered by specified survivors in medical-negligence claims.
Removing that restriction would not require deleting the survivor categories or damages provisions established by subsections (3) and (4).
This supports textual severability.
2. Can the remaining provisions accomplish their purpose?
Florida’s Wrongful Death Act recognizes remedies for qualifying survivors.
The damages provisions in subsections (3) and (4) can operate without the medical-negligence exclusion.
Indeed, they already apply to qualifying claims outside that exclusion.
This supports functional independence.
3. Would the Legislature have enacted the remaining provisions?
This presents the most substantial historical question.
The 1990 political compromise could support an argument that the exclusion was important to obtaining passage.
However, the underlying legislative purpose of expanding remedies, the separate operation of subsections (3) and (4), and the 2025 Legislature’s approval of repeal provide grounds for arguing that the remaining remedies should be preserved.
The dispositive inquiry concerns legislative intent under Florida severability law, not merely the preferences of organizations involved in the original negotiations.
4. Would a complete and operative statute remain?
Eliminating subsection (8) would leave the Wrongful Death Act’s surviving definitions, damages provisions, and procedural framework intact.
This supports the conclusion that a workable statute would remain.
Taken together, these considerations provide a substantial argument for severability, subject to a complete examination of Chapter 90-14 and the original legislative record.
VII. Constitutional supremacy is not subordinate to legislative compromise
Article I, section 21 of the Florida Constitution protects access to courts for redress of injury.
Whether subsection (8) violates that constitutional protection requires an independent analysis of the applicable law and controlling precedents.
But the constitutional question cannot be answered solely by asserting that the exclusion was necessary to secure legislative agreement in 1990.
Legislative compromises remain subject to constitutional limitations.
If a provision is unconstitutional, severability determines what remains—not whether constitutional supremacy may be disregarded to preserve the bargain.
The Legislature retains authority to enact replacement legislation consistent with the Constitution.
The potential inconvenience of legislative reconsideration cannot itself validate an unconstitutional provision.
VIII. The larger question: Can an exclusion make itself difficult to challenge?
The historical record raises a broader issue extending beyond severability.
By excluding specified survivors from noneconomic recovery, subsection (8) can reduce the potential value of wrongful-death claims involving medical negligence.
Medical-negligence litigation also requires compliance with specialized presuit procedures and may involve substantial expert-investigation expenses.
Where potential recovery is insufficient to finance litigation, obtaining contingency-fee representation can become economically difficult.
This raises a question that deserves consideration in both constitutional research and future legislative reform:
Did the 1990 legislative compromise create a statutory exclusion that subsequent generations of plaintiffs would find extraordinarily difficult to challenge because the exclusion itself reduced the financial incentive to undertake the litigation?
That question does not depend on proving an agreement between the FMA and Academy not to litigate the exclusion.
The statutory structure itself provides a basis for examining the relationship between damages restrictions, litigation economics, attorney availability, and meaningful access to courts.
It also presents an important legislative-policy question:
When the Legislature restricts recoverable damages, should it consider whether the remaining remedy can realistically support the legal expenses required to establish liability and obtain recovery?
IX. Conclusion
Florida’s severability doctrine predates Chapter 90-14 by decades.
In Cramp, the Florida Supreme Court demonstrated that unconstitutional statutory language can be removed while preserving an otherwise operative enactment.
During the original Mizrahi and Garber litigation, petitioners expressly argued for removing subsection (8) without invalidating the remainder of the expanded survivor remedies.
In 2025, both chambers of the Florida Legislature approved legislation that would accomplish substantially that result.
The 1990 political compromise remains relevant to the severability inquiry, particularly the question of legislative intent.
But the existence of a political compromise does not, standing alone, establish that the medical-negligence exclusion must remain inseparable from the survivor remedies.
A political compromise may explain why a statute was enacted. It does not establish that every provision of that compromise is constitutionally permissible.
Ultimately, the governing question is whether the Constitution permits the challenged restriction and, if it does not, whether the valid portions of the Legislature’s work can continue operating independently.
Florida’s severability doctrine provides a means of preserving valid legislation without preserving unconstitutional restrictions.
Primary legal authorities
- Cramp v. Board of Public Instruction of Orange County, 137 So. 2d 828 (Fla. 1962).
- Harris v. Bryan, 89 So. 2d 601 (Fla. 1956).
- Kass v. Lewin, 104 So. 2d 572 (Fla. 1958).
- Smith v. Department of Insurance, 507 So. 2d 1080 (Fla. 1987).
- Ray v. Mortham, 742 So. 2d 1276 (Fla. 1999).
- Mizrahi v. North Miami Medical Center, 761 So. 2d 1040 (Fla. 2000).
- Chapter 90-14, Laws of Florida (1990).
- Article I, section 21 of the Florida Constitution
- Florida HB 6017 (2025), legislative voting history and veto.
Historical litigation documents
- Association for Responsible Medicine, original and revised amicus briefs, Mizrahi, Case No. 93,649.
- Petitioners’ briefs in Mizrahi and Garber, Case Nos. 93,649 and 93,650.
- Florida Supreme Court dockets in Mizrahi, Garber, and Stewart.
- Florida Supreme Court oral argument, Mizrahi/Garber, June 10, 1999.
Research classification: Constitutional analysis, historical research, and legislative-policy questions. Historical allegations are attributed to their sources and distinguished from established judicial findings.